The two big political campaigns of 2016 that led to a vote for
Brexit in the UK and the election of Donald Trump as
president in the USA seemed to actively engage many people
who had not previously been involved in politics. In both
cases `underdog´ campaigns, which were initially expected
to lose, claimed that the 'mainstream media' were biased
against them and in collusion with the 'establishment'. In both
cases these underdog campaigns used social media to appeal
directly to the people claiming that they should ignore the
opinions of 'experts' because they were all just part of the
establishment. From its inception the Internet had brought
with it the promise of more direct democracy. In facilitating
access to important decision making debates of many who
previously felt excluded from politics the Internet seems to
have realised something of this early promise.
So is the reason why so many commentators are blaming
social media for a failure of democracy just evidence of the
political bias of educated elites? Partly. It is difficult for
commentators to blame ‘democracy’ or to blame ‘the voters’
and so they blame social media instead. The main crime of
social media seems to be revealing how voters really think. It
is possible, probable even, that most voters have always been
ignorant, credulous and malevolent in their private thoughts
and private conversations, the number of political exchanges
carried now by social media just makes it possible for us all
to see this clearly as if for the first time. One Trump supporter
challenged on TV to justify remarks by Donald Trump,
remarks about third world countries which all ‘mainstream
media’ commentators seemed to disapprove of, responded
‘he is just saying what everyone really thinks’.
However, there is also a slightly more substantial claim
against the role of the Internet. This is that the use of social
media in elections privileged `fake news´. More people, for
example, read the false story released over Facebook that the
pope endorsed Donald Trump for president than read the
rebuttal of this story.1 This tendency to promote falsehoods
might be structural. Companies like Facebook, Google, and
Twitter, have established personalization algorithms that
cater specific information to individuals’ online newsfeeds2
.
This is driven by what people like or might like and not at all
by what is good for them or what is true. These algorithms
are intended to make advertising more focused and so
increase revenue for these companies following a capitalist
implicit logic rather than any explicit political agenda. The
unintended political consequence, it has been claimed, is
supporting `fake news´ and cultural tribalism.
If algorithms are causing this problem, this issue can and
should be addressed through democratic steering
mechanisms. But there is also a more obviously educational
issue here. The claim that false news spreading on Facebook
influenced the outcomes of elections in the USA led to
Facebook developing a tool giving users tips on how to read
posts and how to spot `fake news´ stories and the strong
advice not to pass them on through sharing. This is not
enough of course, but it points the way to an educational
direction that we need to take further.
A problem with the concept of `fake news´ is that it
depends upon an implicit contrast with the concept of `true
news´. Is `true news´ perhaps intended to be the sort of news
we used to get before the advent of the Internet? But of
course, all such truths, and untruths, have to be constructed
in order to reach us. The contrast here is not only between
`true´ and `false´ but also between traditional media and new
media.
Perhaps the prevalence of 'post-truth' and 'fake news' is a
product of readers who have been educated to accept the truth
of what they read and hear through one dominant set of media
now being exposed to new media. Classic media are all
centralised ‘one-to-many’ broadcasters meaning that
someone at the centre owns the printing presses or the tv
stations. New media enable everyone and anyone to be a
producer of the news. This shift in dominant media might
mean that consumers of news have to learn to take a more
critical and co-constructive attitude towards the truth:
triangulating various sources before accepting a story as true,
for example.
The `true´ news and the `truth´ that is implicitly presumed
to have existed before the `post-truth´ age was always already
biased and always already should have required a more
critical way of reading. Creating and delivering news
effectively via the Internet requires a shift in readers from
being passive recipients of other people’s version of truth to
active criticism and participatory co-construction of their
own truths. This is potentially a good thing for democracy
even if, initially, the failure to make this shift leads to the
apparently harmful effect of believing and sharing false
news. Education here might have an important role to play in
teaching children and students how to read critically and
participate more effectively in political debates.
Commentators who complain that the Internet is
undermining democracy probably do not understand
democracy to be simply a matter of counting votes. The
claimed failure of social media is a failure to adequately
support the kind of constructive dialogue that is a key feature
of deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy is about
making decisions only after reasoning together according to
on_education Journal for Research and Debate _ISSN 2571-7855 _DOI 10.17899/on_ed.2018.1.7 _vol.1_issue #1 2
good democratic norms like allowing all to speak, listening
to all voices with respect and, of course, not threatening
others or telling lies designed to trick them.
The concern over the role of social media in democracy
could be taken as a prompt to schools to reinforce efforts to
teach everyone the norms of deliberative democracy.
However, the value of education into deliberative democracy
has been questioned by influential voices within academia.
Gert Biesta, a widely cited educational theorist and
researcher, argues against the teaching of any moral norms or
discourse norms using an account of democracy he borrows
from Rancière (Biesta, 2007, 2011). Rancière claims that any
system of norms, including the procedural rules of
deliberative democracy, becomes a kind of regime or what he
calls a 'police state', which inevitably includes some and
excludes others. According to Rancière, real democracy is
not to be found in any normative system but only when the
system is challenged in the name of equality. Democracy is
therefore only to be found sporadically. According to Biesta,
we should educate in a way that allows for such sporadic
events and supports their educative potential. The argument
from Rancière and from Biesta seems to be that democracy
is not something we have and can give to others by including
them with us in our democratic system, but, almost the
reverse of this, democracy can only be learnt through the act
of challenging the system (Rancière, 1995, p. 48; Biesta,
2007, p. 9).
There is something rather quaintly romantic and innocent
about the way that Rancière is willing to see every state of
order as a 'police state' and every challenge to this as a bid for
equality and for freedom. In the recent context of elections in
the USA and the referendum over ‘Brexit’ in the UK there
were clearly voices that felt excluded challenging what they
saw as the establishment. But as the philosopher John Gray
points out, the challenges that relatively stable liberal
“democracies” now face are often from those who, in his
words, are “happy to relinquish their freedom as long as those
they hate – gay people, Jews, immigrants and other
minorities, for example – are deprived of freedom as well.”3
As Gray further points out, the apparent assumption often
made by left intellectuals that everyone secretly wants
freedom and equality is not well supported by the facts of
human history.4 In this context how is it that norms and
virtues implying the promise of democracy have arisen in
some cultures and are constantly renewed through challenges
and reformation? Perhaps education has something to do with
this.
Stiegler (1998) has argued that western philosophy has
been distorted by a failure to take technology into account.
This distortion is particularly evident in the arguments of
Rancière and Biesta. To describe education into shared
norms as a bad thing (‘colonial’) as Biesta does (2007)
implies that he is either ignoring or not valuing the context of
communications technology. Induction into shared norms for
reading and writing is not easy for children but has proved
essential for collective thinking in which education enables
each new child to participate in the ongoing cultural dialogue
of language communities and potentially at least, of
humanity as a whole. As a result of literacy, what it means to
be human has changed and globalised. The ‘norms’ that
children need to be inducted into for communicative
rationality to work include virtues such as ‘openness to the
other’ which implies being able to listen, to learn and to
change as a result of any encounter. This is not a given. It is
quite possible to present clear evidence and arguments for
something as obvious as the link between the right to bear
arms and the number of gun deaths or man-made climate
change, for example, and to have this evidence rejected by
those who lack basic communicative virtues (Rorty, 1991, p.
39). Just as education into literacy is essential if people are to
be able to read, so education into norms and virtues is
essential if people are to be able to follow arguments and give
consent on the basis of understanding evidence. There is a
very wide agreement that we need universal induction into
shared norms in the form of literacy education in order to
realise the benefits of literacy for the human race. Is it
possible to motivate a similar consensus as to the need for
induction into shared moral and communicative norms for
the use of the Internet to support a future global democracy?
Biesta, following Rancière, seems to want to divide the
spontaneous events that bring awareness of democracy as the
event of calling for justice, from democratic norms and
virtues, as if these two are unconnected. He acknowledges,
however, that some ‘police states’ are better than others,
especially those that have been shaped by the after-effects of
previous events of challenge and democratic awakening.
Perhaps the quality of spontaneous events of awakening to
democracy and the normative structure that children are
inducted into are not so completely unconnected after all.
Tarkovski, in his late film, ‘The Sacrifice’ (Wibom &
Tarkovski, 1986), includes a story of a monk who planted a
barren tree on a hillside and then carried a bucket of water to
it every day for years. This seemed pointless. Then one day,
miraculously, the tree blossomed. The blossoming tree might
not have realised it, but there was a connection between the
water that had been brought every day to its roots
systematically and the apparently miraculous event of its
blossoming. This story could be used as an analogy to what
teachers do in modelling and encouraging norms and virtues
everyday. Even when such norms and virtues are not
apparently picked up by students at the time they might still
have an indirect impact in awakenings later on even if this
impact is unrecognised and remains unthanked. There seems
to be a particular lack of gratitude for all the hard work done
by generations of committed democratic educators since the
Enlightenment stemming from those who prefer to see ethics
as descending from a mysterious beyond – the ‘incalculable’
(Biesta, 2007), the ‘ungovernable’ (Agamben, 2009), the
‘impossible’ (Derrida, 1997) – while they condemn teachers
and educational technologies as part of the apparatsimposing
a ‘police state’.
There is a simple contrast at the heart of the ideal of
democracy. This is the contrast between taking decisions that
impact on everyone in a community on the default basis of
on_education Journal for Research and Debate _ISSN 2571-7855 _DOI 10.17899/on_ed.2018.1.7 _vol.1_issue #1 3
who has the most power and the democratic alternative ideal
or promise: taking decisions on the basis of unforced
agreement emerging out of free and open dialogue between
all who have a stake in the outcome, where all participants
are respected and listened to. At the heart of democracy then
is not simply abstract rationality, but also the cultivation of
the kind of emotions such as compassion and love that allow
the sense of self-interest to expand in order to include others
and so to create together, if only for a moment, a collective
sense of self and a collective agency. Again, education is
crucial to realising this possibility (Nussbaum, 2013).
At this juncture in human history, with the advent of the
Internet and our general confusion about what to do with it,
what we need is not the kind of research that is content to
describe reality, and perhaps to complain about it, but the
kind of research that creates a new reality (Wegerif, 2013). A
possible model to follow here, as a metaphor, is the way in
which aviation began in sustained design-based research
where the only certainty was the aim, building machines that
could enable humans to fly (O’Neill, 2012). We know
roughly what we want now, which is an effective global
democracy, but we do not yet know how to get there.
The aim for educational research should be to design
educational technology systems to achieve this aim, evaluate
their impacts, refine the designs, try again and eventually,
like the aviation pioneers over one hundred years ago, we
might have a system that flies. Of course, perhaps unlike
most early aviation research, this kind of educational
research is not only technical but has to engage with profound
ethical and ontological issues about what kind of future we
want and what kind of beings we want our children to
become. The only real way we have to research such issues
is by making designs and evaluating the impact of designs
where we allow even our most fundamental assumptions and,
indeed, our very selves, to be included in the ongoing selfreflective
and self-reforming research process.
1 Lee, T (2016, November 16). Facebook's fake news problem, explained. Vox. Retrieved from: http://www.vox.com/newmoney/2016/11/16/13637310/facebook-fake-news-explained
2 Lee, T (2016, November 16). Facebook's fake news problem, explained. Vox. Retrieved from: http://www.vox.com/newmoney/2016/11/16/13637310/facebook-fake-news-explained
3 Gray, J. (2015, March 3). What scares the new atheists. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/mar/03/what-scares-the-new-atheists. 4 Gray, J. (2015, March 3). What scares the new atheists. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/mar/03/what-scares-the-new-atheists.
References
Agamben, G. (2009). `What is an Apparatus?´ and Other Essays. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Biesta, G. (2007). Democracy, education and the question of inclusion. Paper Presented at the PESGB Annual Conference.
Retrieved from: http://www.philosophy-of-education.org/conferences/pdfs/BIESTA%20PESGB
Derrida, J. (1997). The Politics of Friendship (G. Collins, Trans.). London: Verso.
Habermas, J. (2001). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Nussbaum, M. (2013). Political emotions: why love matters for justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press.
O'Neill, D. K. (2012). Designs that fly: What the history of aeronautics tells us about the future of design-based research in
education. International Journal of Research & Method in Education, 35(2), 119-140.
Rancière, J., (1995). On the shores of politics. London/New York: Verso.
Rorty,R. (1991). Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wegerif, R. (2013). Dialogic: Education for the Internet Age. London/New York: Routledge.
Wibom, A-L. (Producer) & Tarkovski, A. (Director) (1986) The Sacrifice (Motion Picture). Sweden: Fargo Film AB, Svenska
Filminstitutet.
Stiegler, B. (1998). Technics and time: The fault of Epimetheus (Vol. 1). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Recommended Citation
Wegerif, R. (2018). New Technology and the Apparent Failure of Democracy: An Educational Response. On Education.
Journal for Research and Debate, 1 (1). doi: 10.17899/on_ed.2018.1.7
on_education Journal for Research and Debate _ISSN 2571-7855 _DOI 10.17899/on_ed.2018.1.7 _vol.1_issue #1 4
About the Author
Rupert Wegerif is a Professor of Education at Cambridge where he co-chairs the educational dialogue research group. He also
co-convenes and co-founded the Educational Theory Special Interest Group of the European Association of Research on
Learning and Instruction (EARLI). He has lead and been involved with several large educational technology research projects
and written numerous books and articles outlining his vision of, and design-based research into, dialogic education for the
Internet age.
No comments:
Post a Comment
you say